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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

LIABILITY OF THE FATHER FOR TORTS
COMMITTED BY THE SON WHILE USING
THE FATHER'S AUTOMOBILE
By L. E.

VAUDREUIL,

'22

The question of whether or not the father, who is the owner
of an automobile, is liable for the torts committed by the son or
daughter when using the automobile, is a question involving
many legal propositions, and is of interest not only to the legal
profession but to almost any person who is the owner of an
automobile.
The usual familiar facts are, that the father buys an automobile
for the use of himself and his family. His minor son or daughter
learns to drive and then the possibility of injury to third persons
commences, and the question of liability for such injury arises.
As a general rule of law, the parent is not liable for the torts
of his children.
Liability in this class of cases can be predicated only on the
basis of the relationship of master and servant. In order to hold
the father liable for the tort committed by the child when using
the car, it must be shown that such injury was inflicted while the
child was acting as the servant of the father.
We have another general fundamental rule, which lays down
the proposition that the relationship of parent and child does not
in itself create the relationship of master and servant.
However, no contract of hire is necessary to create the relation
of master and servant. It is sufficient to create that relation,
that one charged as such servant, whether a child or a person in
no way related, is permitted habitually to perform work, drive
the car or otherwise act as a servant of the owner, according to
the circumstances of the case, with the knowledge and consent
or acquiescence of the owner.
So it would seem that mere authority given by the father to the
child to drive the car, would create the relationship of master and
servant and thus render the father liable.
In the case of Schaefer vs. Osterbrink, 67 Wis. 502, the following charge to the jury was upheld:
The presumption is that a minor child living with his father and using
his conveyance in and about the business of such father, is acting on his
behalf and under his directions, until the contrary is made to appear by
the evidence. The burden to show that the child was not acting as his
agent is on the father.
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All the principles involved in the creation of the relationship
of master and servant are applicable in determining whether or
not that relationship existed between parent and child, and when
that relationship is once established, the liability of the parent
for the torts of his child is exactly the same as the liability of the
master for the torts of the servant. If the tort is committed
within the scope of the authority or employment, the master or
parent is liable.
The whole situation finally resolves itself into the question
of whether or not, at the time the tort was committed, the child
was acting within the scope of his agency. It is well settled
that if a child is on a frolic of his own, and against directions
and without authority of the parent, the latter is not liable for
the tort.
In the case of Hiroux vs. Baum, 137 Wis. 197, the plaintiff was

at work in the street and was run down and injured by an
automobile owned by the defendant, and driven at the time of the
accident by the defendant's son. One of the members of the firm
from whom the car had been purchased was teaching the son to
drive the car at the time of the accident in accordance with an
agreement between the vendor and the defendant. The court
held the father liable, saying:
If the son was running the car by authority of the father, that would
be sufficient to make a pritna fade case of master and servant.
On the facts shown the jury was warranted in finding that the
son was the agent and servant of the defendant in the operation
of the car.
The relationship of master and servant, in this case, is established not only by the fact that the son was authorized to drive
the car; but also because he was learning to drive the car for
subsequent services and was clearly within the scope of his
employment.
In the case of Jaeger vs. Salentine, 171 Wis. 632, the son was
the only member of the family who drove the car owned by the
father. He was in the habit of taking the car whenever he wished
without any objection on the part of the father. When any
member of the family wanted to go anywhere, the son simply
took them. On the day of the accident of the defendant's
daughter was visiting at his home, and while the son was taking
her back to the city with the father's car, the accident occurred.
The court held that the jury was warranted in finding that the
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son was the agent of the father and that the accident happened
when the son was acting as such agent.
The theory of agency in this case can also be supported on
the basis that it was the father's business to take his daughter
back to the city after her visit and that the son acted in his behalf
and as his agent in driving the car.
It seems that a blanket and general authority to use the automobile at any time and for all occasions will constitute the relationship of master and servant, as to transactions involving the
use of the car. However, if we take mere authorization as sufficient to establish the relationship of master and servant, and if
we apply it logically to other propositions, we will run on to some
stumbling blocks. Starting out with the rule that the relation of
parent and child does not affect the relation of master and servant,
we can logically deduce, that authority given to any person to
drive the owner's car, will render the owner liable for torts committed by the use of the car.
That conclusion would be manifestly unjust and very impracticable. Under such circumstances no man could ever lend his car
to a friend, without assuming liability for the torts which might
result.
However, the relation of master and servant can be based on
the theory that the father of a family may take it upon himself
and make it his business to furnish amusement and pleasure for
his family and when any member of the family is putting the
father's purpose into execution and is driving the car for his
own pleasure, he is performing the business of his father, and
he is the servant of his father, and his father is therefore liable
for torts which might be committed by the use of the car.
It would seem that if the father takes it upon himself to furnish
a mode of amusement for his family and if such means of amusement are the weaponjs by which injury is inflicted upon thirt
persons the father should be held liable.
It is a manifestly unjust situation when a father can buy an
automobile which in itself has qualities of potential harm; turn
it over to his minor son who in many cases is judgment proof,
and allow him to drive at any time and any place and under any
conditions. Wheni an innocent third person is injured, the father
should not be allowed to say, "I know I furnished the car to my
son, I let him have it whenever he wanted it,
but r am not responsible for the accident; I am not liable to the third person who is
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injured simply because the parent is not liable for the torts of his
child."
Some courts have held that an automobile is in itself a dangerous article, and have predicated liability to the owner on the
theory that he who furnishes another with a dangerous implement
is responsible for the injury done. However, this theory is applicable only in those jurisdictions where it is held that an automobile is in itself dangerous.
The question of the danger in driving an automobile is an open
one, and opens up a fruitful field of discussion. With the inexperienced driver it is dangerous not only to himself but anyone
who might venture out of doors. Considering the number of
accidents even to experienced drivers, there is much evidence to
show that an automobile is dangerous in itself.
The phase of imputed negligence deserves some discussion in
this connection. By imputed negligence is meant, that the neglih
gence of the driver is chargeable to the owner or other occupants
of the car. However, this doctrine is applicable only to the case
where one of the occupants of the car is injured by the negligence
of the driver, and does not affect third persons.
In the case of Reiter vs. Goohes, 173 Wis. 493, the father owned
the automobile which was driven by the son. The son had invited
the father to take a trip with him, and while on this journey the
accident occurred. In an action to hold the father liable for the
injury the court said:
A man may be a guest in his own automobile.

So even if the man

owned the machine, . . . he would have to be classed as a guest
therein so far as this trip is concerned. "...
As a guest is he liable to the plaintiff for the negligence of the
driver? The case of Prideaux 7S. Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513,
holds that the driver of a private conveyance is the agent of a
person riding therein to the extent that if his negligence contributes jointly with that of a third person to an injury received by
the occupant there can be no recovery against the third person
because the negligence of the driver is imputed to the occupant,
thus creating contributory negligence barring recovery. There is a
difference between the rule as announced in the Prideaux case and
the claim made by the plaintiff in the Reiter case. A person may
well be content to trust his own safety to a driver, and yet not be
willing to indemnify third persons who may suffer through his
negligence.
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In the Reiter case the court said:
To extend the doctrine to that degree would make a guest in a private
conveyance an insurer of third persons against the negligence of the
driver. Instead of being invested with the liabilities of a guest he would
shoulder those of a master. We not only decline to so extend the rule
of Prdea x vs. Mineral Point, in so far as it imputes the negligence of
the driver of a private vehicle to an occupant therein, but we take this
occasion to expressly overrule it.

In this case the son was on an errand of his own, was not about
his father's business and the relation of master and servant was
not created.
Even though the father was the owner of the car, he was simply
a guest of his son for that particular trip, and since the son wars
not about the business of his father, but on his own business, the
father was in no way liable.
In summing up, the law in this state is that the father is liable,
for the torts of his child when driving the family car, only on the
theory of agency. The relationship of master and servant must
exist. The problem in each case is to determine whether or not
that relationship existed at the time of the accident. Considering
the facts necessary to show this relationship, it is clear that all
these problems can be solved justly and on a firm legal basis.
The legal theories upon which the solution of these problems
depend, are old, but their applicability and extreme importance
are new, and the fundamental principles will apply.

